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Abstract
This paper develops an experimental approach to measure competition among in-
termediaries in agricultural markets, based on the random allocation of subsidies to
traders. We show that, in individual-level randomizations with competitive spillovers,
treatment-control differences in prices can inform an intuitive test of the degree of dif-
ferentiation among firms. In the context of the Sierra Leone cocoa industry, traders
compete by providing farmers credit, as well as through prices. Even when accounting
for both the price and the credit margin, differentiation among traders is low. By com-
bining the experimental results with quasi-experimental estimates of the pass-through
rate, we then estimate market size—the effective number of traders competing for farm-
ers’ supply—and we find it to be substantially larger than the village. These results
are consistent with a view of competitive agricultural markets.
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1 Introduction
The degree to which intermediaries compete is a long-standing object of interest in stud-
ies of agricultural markets in developing countries. Competition shapes how price signals
propagate along supply chains, and the welfare implications of taxes and subsidies for pro-
ducers and consumers. In this paper, we propose an experimental approach to estimate the
degree of competition. Our experiment, which takes place in the Sierra Leone cocoa industry
during the 2011 harvest season, is based on the randomization of unit subsidies to competing
traders for their purchases from farmers. The main idea is that the difference in the prices
that subsidized and unsubsidized firms pay is informative of the degree of differentiation
among them. The basic estimation procedure uses only price data collected over one season,
and thus presents advantages relative to other methods that require detailed trader cost data,
a large cross section of markets, or a long time series.
In two influential papers, Weyl and Fabinger (2013) and Atkin and Donaldson (2015) show
that, in a general model of symmetric imperfect competition, the pass-through rate—i.e.,
the difference in prices between two markets with an infinitesimal difference in costs for all
producers—is the key object to recover the degree of competition in the market. Experimental
or quasi-experimental analysis of pass-through thus requires studying plausibly independent
markets that experience different cost shocks. However, researchers face common constraints
in the design of market-level experiments. Defining truly independent markets can easily
imply that the cluster size is so large that there are too few clusters (or, in the extreme
case, a single cluster containing all firms), or that randomization across markets would be
very expensive. This paper shows how an experimental approach can be valuable even in
these cases. Using solely individual-level randomization (i.e., without variation in the cluster
treatment intensity), it provides an intuitive interpretation of the treatment-control difference
between subsidized and unsubsidized firms when there are competitive spillovers across the
two groups of firms.
A simple framework of oligopsonistic competition among (potentially) differentiated traders
guides the empirical analysis. In the framework, farmers sell their output to traders (at the
“trader’s price”) and traders resell it to wholesalers (at the “wholesaler’s price”). The differ-
entiation parameter captures a trader’s ability to buy at a lower price than her competitors.1
1In the model, the differentiation rate is related to the extent to which prices paid by competitors affect
the quantity supplied to a trader, relative to the trader’s own price sensitivity. More precisely, since our
framework features quantity-setting traders, the differentiation rate depends on the ratio between the slope
1
The model highlights the strategic interaction between subsidized and unsubsidized traders
that compete with each other: in equilibrium, unsubsidized traders, as well as subsidized
ones, adjust their behavior in response to the subsidy. Therefore, differences between treat-
ment and control during the experiment cannot be interpreted as Rubin (1974) treatment
effects. However, randomization ensures that subsidies are uncorrelated with firm character-
istics and thus that the treatment-control price differences arise only from the experimental
subsidy.
In the first contribution of the paper, we thus propose a simple relationship between the
treatment-control difference in the prices that traders pay to farmers during the experiment
and the differentiation rate across traders. Intuitively, there can be no systematic difference
between the prices paid by subsidized and unsubsidized traders if traders are perfectly homo-
geneous from the farmers’ perspective. In this case, there will be only one “market price”. If
traders are differentiated, however, different prices can coexist and unsubsidized traders can
pay farmers a lower price than subsidized ones do. Through this insight, our experimental
results can recover the degree of differentiation among traders.
Differentiation among traders can emerge for a several reasons. Recent literature has
emphasized the role of search costs (Jensen, 2007; Aker, 2010; Allen, 2014, Startz, 2016). In
addition, lack of trust between farmers and traders may also limit the opportunity to switch if
some dimension of the contract, such as cocoa quality, is not perfectly observable or enforce-
able. As emphasized by the large literature on interlinked transactions, trader’s provision of
financial services to the farmers may be another important source of differentiation.2 In our
setting, farmers use advance payments for consumption smoothing or input purchases (e.g.
to hire workers that harvest trees).
In the second contribution of the paper, we thus highlight the importance of account-
ing for credit provision, and more generally interlinked transactions, when studying price
transmission and rent distribution in the value chain. We develop two strategies to measure
the value of advance payments—one based on baseline correlations in prices and advances
across villages and one based on experimental treatment heterogeneity. While using different
sources of variation, both methods deliver significant and quantitatively reasonable estimates
of the value of advance payments.
of a trader’s inverse supply to her competitors’ quantity and the slope to her own quantity.
2Bardhan (1980), Bell (1988), and Bardhan and Udry (1999) summarize a large body of theory that
relates land, labor, output, and credit markets. Blouin and Macchiavello (2017), Casaburi and Willis (2016),
Casaburi and Macchiavello (2016), Ghani and Reed (2017), and Macchiavello and Morjaria (2015a) provide
primarily empirical contributions.
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In the experiment, wholesalers pay treatment traders (which are about 20% of the traders
operating in the study region) a per-unit subsidy worth about 5% of the average trader price.3
The subsidy intervention lasts until the end of the harvest season. During the experimental
period, treatment traders pay similar prices to farmers than control traders. They are also
more likely to provide advance payments to farmers that they report as regular suppliers at
baseline (+14 percentage points, a 117% increase). On average, those farmers that did not
receive more advance payments from treatment traders (relative to control ones) did receive
a higher price from them. We then compute the difference between treatment and control
traders in the “effective price,” a price that accounts for advance payments and thus akin
to the net present value of the transaction. This difference—which as discussed above is not
(generally) a treatment effect—amounts to one-tenth to one-sixth of the subsidy value. By
matching this difference to the analog equilibrium equation in the model, we obtain estimates
of the differentiation rate that range between 0.1 and 0.2, on a 0 to 1 scale (where 0 implies
complete homogeneity and 1 implies that each trader operates as a monopsonist).4
In the model, this differentiation rate summarizes the level of competition in the market
for a given number of competitors. Typically, (quasi-) experimental studies define market
boundaries, and thus the number of competitors in a market, ex-ante. Thus, in this standard
approach, our experimental results are sufficient to recover the degree of competition. We
however acknowledge that defining appropriate randomization clusters may be difficult. For
instance, farmers may have the option to sell to traders that operate primarily in other
villages, a unit often used as experimental cluster. In addition, traders in many agricultural
value chains, including the one we study, buy from farmers in several locations and overlap
only partially with the operation areas of other traders. These features complicate again the
design of market-level randomizations.
Therefore, in the third contribution of the paper, we propose a methodology to estimate
market size, rather than assuming it. For this purpose, we combine the treatment-control dif-
ference in prices with quasi-experimental estimates of the pass-through rate from wholesaler
to trader prices (i.e. of a common cost shock affecting all traders), which we obtain from
plausibly exogenous variation in world cocoa prices. We find a pass-through rate of 0.92,
which is in line with evidence from cocoa value chains in neighboring countries (Gayi and
Tsowou, 2015). For a given level of differentiation, the model relates the pass-through rate to
3In our setting, traders typically have exclusive relationships and only sell to one wholesaler.
4In terms of the model, this implies that the slope of a trader inverse supply to a competitor’s quantity
is eighty to ninety percent of the slope to her own quantity.
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the “effective market size”. Our estimate of this market size is 14 traders. The interpretation
of this result is that traders behave as if the number of their competitors were substantially
larger than just the number of traders operating in the same village (7.8).5 Overall, our re-
sults suggest that the market is quite competitive, with a low degree of differentiation and a
large market size. In line with this result, while paying a slightly higher effective price to the
farmers, treatment traders purchase substantially more cocoa (+188%) than control farmers
during the experimental period. As a benchmark, in a perfectly competitive case, treatment
traders would take the entire market as long as they charge an infinitesimally higher price.
The treatment-control difference in prices provides a simple test of the null hypothesis
of homogeneous (i.e. non-differentiated) firms. The logic of the test holds in many models
of imperfect competition (e.g., oligopoly, monopolistic competition, and search frictions).6
However, the estimation of the market structure parameters obviously depends on the specific
functional forms of the model, which, as we discuss extensively in the paper, in our case are
quite restrictive. We thus provide additional evidence to validate the framework choice. First,
since the model is overidentified, we can use different moments (i.e., the percent differences
between treatment and control traders in prices and quantities) to recover the two market
structure parameters. These new parameter estimates are very close to those we had obtained
using the first set of moments (we also show that this result is not mechanical). This similarity
supports the model choice. Second, we present evidence suggesting that alternative models
such as Bertrand, monopsonistic competition, and collusion among traders are not consistent
with the data.
Through the model, we can then quantify the impact of the experiment relative to a
counterfactual scenario without the experiment. The experimental subsidy raises effective
prices by about one-third of the subsidy (i.e., by about 1.5% of the average price level) for
treatment traders and by one-sixth for control traders. This confirms that the treatment-
control difference in prices, which we find to be one-sixth of the subsidy, is the result of
partial price competition between treatment and control traders in response to the interven-
tion. Further, the difference in quantities purchased arises almost entirely from treatment
traders stealing from control traders (and from non-study traders, who are about 60% of the
traders in the market). Aggregate supply increases at most by 0.9%.7 In turn, total farmer
5Our baseline empirical approach assumes homogeneous villages in terms of the number of traders per
farmer. In the paper, we discuss how to account for heterogeneity along this margin.
6The intuition is that in all these models, when firms have heterogeneous costs, there is a unique market
price only if the firms are not differentiated.
7The lack of change in aggregate quantity is consistent with the fact that the experiment began halfway
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revenues increased by 1 to 1.7%. Finally, we quantify the impact of counterfactual subsidy
programs treating different shares of traders, given the value of the competition parameters
we recovered. We show that, for a given level of pass-through, the welfare impact of a sub-
sidy program targeting only a subset of traders varies with the differentiation rate. Given
that industrial policies often target only a subsample of firms, this result emphasizes the
importance of estimating specifically the differentiation rate parameter.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first experiment that randomized any treatment
at the trader level in agricultural markets and that used experimental subsidies to study com-
petition. It relates to a growing body of work that seeks to estimate the equilibrium effects
of (quasi-)experiments using market-level randomization.8 Recent examples include Cre´pon
et al. (2013), Cunha et al. (2015), Lalive et al. (2015), Baird et al. (2014), Hildebrandt et al.
(2015), Burke (2014), Mobarak and Rosenzweig (2014), Muralidharan et al. (2016), McKen-
zie and Puerto (2017), and Breza and Kinnan (2016).9 Several recent papers that study
competition using market-level variation are particularly related to this paper (Busso and
Galiani, 2014, Jensen and Miller, 2016, Mitra et al., 2013, Rotemberg, 2017, Bergquist, 2017).
In particular, Rotemberg (2017) identifies the spillover effects on larger firms of a subsidy
available only to small firms in India, using variation in exposure to eligible competitors, and
Bergquist (2017) randomizes subsidies across markets in Western Kenya to maize consumers
and traders, in order to infer market structure parameters of the Atkin and Donaldson (2015)
framework.
Relative to this body of work, our paper provides a proof of concept of how purely
individual-level randomization can shed light on market structure parameters even in the
presence of competitive spillovers. It complements the contribution of Atkin and Donaldson
(2015) by using exogenous cost shocks that vary across firms in the same market, rather than
across markets, to inform the measurement of competition. As a first step in this direction,
the paper leaves several avenues open for future work. For instance, since the experiment
introduces heterogeneity across subsidized and unsubsidized firms, the Atkin and Donaldson
(2015) general model of symmetric imperfect competition is not readily applicable.10 We
in the harvest season and thus farmers had limited options to increase their output volume (for instance by
harvesting marginal fruits, at the top of the trees, or by reducing processing losses.
8Other theoretical and empirical contributions on the role of intermediaries in supply chains include Antra`s
and Costinot (2011), Bardhan et al. (2013), Chau et al. (2016), Maitra et al. (2014), and Emran et al. (2017).
9Researchers have started acknowledging the need to expand the size of the cluster beyond the village. For
instance, Muralidharan and Niehaus, 2016 discuss the benefits and challenges of randomization “at scale”.
10Weyl and Fabinger (2013) illustrates the complications that arise when modeling asymmetric firms in
the framework.
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thus work with a less general model (which we however attempt to validate). With this in
mind, we also highlight several benefits. First, as discussed, individual-level randomization
may be the only option if there are economic constraints or structural limitations (e.g., if the
program targets only one or few large markets). Second, the differentiation rate among firms,
the parameter we recover solely from the experiment results, is policy relevant. It shapes,
for a given pass-through, the distributional impact of subsidies that target a subset of the
firms in the market. Third, in principle, individual-level randomization can generate distinct
market structure estimates in each location. Future research may explore synergies between
market-level and individual-level experimentation to understand market structure.
Finally, the paper contributes to the literature on the competitiveness of agricultural
markets in developing countries. Our experimental design provides a simple test that we
hope can be replicated in other settings. This approach complements previous studies of
competition that have primarily relied on observational data, analyzing trader price-cost
margins (for the case of Sub-Saharan Africa, see, e.g., Fafchamps et al., 2005; Osborne, 2005;
Sitko and Jayne, 2014), price dispersion across space (Fackler and Goodwin, 2001; Aker,
2010), or the pass-through of international prices along the supply chain (Fafchamps and
Hill, 2008; Dillon and Barrett, 2015). Our evidence of competitive crop markets is in line
with the review by Dillon and Dambro (2016). We also add to this evidence by showing that
low differentiation and high competition can coexist with high prevalence of financial service
provision (e.g. credit) from traders to farmers. This insight may be useful in considering the
external relevance of our findings to other settings.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides background information
on the study setting and the experimental design. Section 3 presents the model and the
strategy to recover the competition parameters. Section 4 presents the experimental results
and recovers the trader differentiation rate. Section 5 combines our experimental results
and quasi-experimental estimates of pass-through to further recover market size. Section
6 provides additional evidence in support of the model choice and it presents model-based
analysis of the impact of the experiment. Section 7 concludes.
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2 Study Setting and Experimental Design
2.1 The Sierra Leone Cocoa Value Chain
Though Sierra Leone accounts for only a small share of the world production, cocoa is
important nationally. The crop comprised 8.6% of exports in 2009, and is the largest export
crop by value, according to UN COMTRADE. The harvest season typically lasts from August
until the end of the year. Climatic differences cause variation in specific harvest times both
across locations and across years in a given location. A given farmer may be harvesting at
different times depending on the location of her plots or the age of the trees.
The within-country cocoa trade in Sierra Leone is fragmented across many traders, and the
supply chain has many links, similar to other agricultural markets in developing economies
(for examples in Africa see Fafchamps et al., 2005 and Osborne, 2005).11 Farmers sell to
traders, who sell to wholesalers in small towns, who in turn sell to exporters in larger towns,
who in turn sell to buyers at the port. While it is important to study the degree of competition
in each of the links of the supply chain, we focus on the link closest to production, and leave
the examination of other levels for future research.
As emphasized by Atkin and Donaldson (2015), when looking at prices, it is important to
focus on narrowly defined homogeneous goods. The quality of cocoa is indeed heterogeneous,
and market prices depend on a variety of characteristics including moisture content, mold,
germination, lack of fermentation and a discoloration known as slate. Though there is no offi-
cial measure of quality in the market, wholesalers and traders agree on broad determinants of
quality that are consistent with international standards (see Fold, 2005). A quality premium
exists in the market to some extent. In our experiment, in order to ensure we measure prices
for a well-defined homogeneous good, we worked with the partner wholesalers to develop
a quantitative quality grade that correlates well with baseline prices. When traders arrive
at the warehouse, inspectors hired by the research team sampled 50 beans from each bag,
and used them to create an index of quality—grades A, B or C—which was then applied to
each bag.12 The analysis in this paper focuses on grade A cocoa, the grade targeted by the
experimental subsidy, unless otherwise specified.
11Sierra Leone’s cocoa industry is similar to those in Cameroon, Ivory Coast, and Nigeria, all of which,
unlike Ghana, liberalized during the 1990s and became similarly fragmented (see, e.g., Gilbert et al., 2009).
12Appendix B provides details.
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2.2 Experimental Design
We developed our experiment in partnership with five privately owned wholesalers in
Sierra Leone’s cocoa producing Eastern Province, in the towns of Segbwema, Pendembu,
and Kailahun. These wholesalers collect cocoa in their warehouses use a network of trader
with whom they have exclusive relations (i.e. a trader almost always delivers cocoa only
to one wholesaler). Traders purchase cocoa from farmers and within a few days deliver to
wholesalers. These then sell to exporters in the provincial capital of Kenema or in Freetown.
Our sample includes 80 traders, henceforth study traders. This comprises almost all of the
traders who do business regularly with these wholesalers.
During the experiment, a random subset of 40 traders received a bonus of 150 Leones
—5.6% of the average wholesale price —when selling grade A cocoa purchases from farmers
to the wholesalers. The experiment ran from mid-October to the end of December of 2011,
roughly the end of the harvest season. At the beginning of the experiment, traders were
informed the treatment would last until about the end of the harvest season.
Randomization occurred at the trader level. We implement a pairwise randomization
strategy (see, e.g., Bruhn and McKenzie, 2009): we matched traders within wholesalers
according to a self-reported estimate of the volume of purchases since the beginning of the
cocoa season and then assigned treatment and control within pairs.13
2.3 Data Collection and Summary Statistics
Over the course of the experiment, we collected a variety of data from traders. At base-
line, we interviewed each trader about his experience in the industry, and collected basic
demographic indicators. We also asked traders to list each farmer they buy from regularly
and all of the villages in which they buy. Table 1, Panel A presents summary statistics and
shows that treatment and control groups are balanced on these trader-level covariates. In
the baseline listing, traders report purchasing cocoa from 123 villages. The average trader
operates in 4.6 villages, and buys from 6 farmers per village.14 On average, based on the
trader survey, there are 7.8 traders operating in a village. However, only 3.2 of these are
study traders, suggesting that about 60% of the traders in the market are non-study traders
13Of the 84 traders identified by wholesalers, four were outliers with respect to baseline quantity relative to
other traders (within the same wholesaler), and could not be matched to other traders in our randomization
strategy. Thus, the final sample selected for randomization was 80 traders.
14Figure 1 presents a map of the study setting.
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(i.e. working with other wholesalers). In Section 3.4, we discuss the implications of this fact
for our estimation approach.
The provision of loans by traders to farmers is an important characteristic of this indus-
try.15 Traders offer to purchase cocoa in advance before and during the harvesting season.
Farmers use the advance payments for production (e.g., hiring workers for harvesting) or for
consumption smoothing. Farmers then pay for these advances by selling at a below market
price for subsequent sales.16 Contracts are enforced through customary authorities (see, e.g.,
Acemoglu et al., 2014 and Sandefur and Siddiqi, 2013) or through relational contracts (see,
e.g., Fafchamps, 2003 and Macchiavello and Morjaria, 2015b). Study traders report having
given at least one loan to about 70% of the suppliers listed at baseline in the previous year.
During the experiment, when traders arrived at the warehouse, inspectors from the re-
search team measured and documented the quality of their shipment.17 Enumerators then
asked traders the price per pound they paid to farmers and the name of the village where
the cocoa mostly originated. Traders typically mix cocoa from different farmers in the same
bag, and so farmer prices reported are the average per unit purchase price paid by a trader
for the cocoa in the bag.18 In addition, to study the impact of trader treatment on advance
payment provision, in November and December we asked again the traders if they had given
loans in the previous month to the farmers listed at baseline.
In the three weeks preceding the intervention, 56 of the 80 traders (27 control and 29
treatment) visited the warehouses. Table 1 Panel B shows that treatment and control groups
are balanced along volume purchased and prices paid to farmers. During the experiment, 74
traders visited the warehouse (36 controls and 38 treatment).19
15Other agricultural value chains feature supply chain credit provision. Emran et al. (2017) study the
impact of such credit provision on the price response to policy reforms.
16Interviews to farmers and traders suggest that these contracts do not define the price of the transaction,
which is instead based on the market price at the time of the delivery. Rather, they define the amount to be
deducted from the final payment (i.e., the interest).
17Data collection ran from September 24th, 2011 to December 31st, 2011. The intervention started on
October 15th, 2011. Because of project budget constraints, data collection was suspended for approximately
two weeks and half between late November and early December.
18In Section 4, we discuss potential concerns arising from the self-reported nature of the data.
19The regressions presented in the rest of the paper include pair fixed effects. Therefore, we effectively
drop pairs of those traders that did not visit the warehouses.
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3 A Simple Model of Buyers’ Imperfect Competition
This section presents a simple framework of oligopsonistic competition among buyers and
it models the impact of a subsidy to a subset of buyers (akin to our experimental treatment).
We derive closed form solutions for equilibrium prices and quantities of treatment and control
traders and for the differences in outcomes between the two groups.
3.1 Setup
Producers
The economy is composed by V villages. In each village, there are measure one homoge-
neous producers, each producing a unit of output and there are n buyers who compete for
these producers’ output. The inverse supply buyer i faces in a village is:20
pi = α + βqi + γ
∑
j 6=i
qj. (1)
We adapt the standard model of linear demand and differentiated producers (see, e.g., Vives,
2001) to our setting, which features imperfect competition among buyers.21 Section 3.3
discusses the assumptions of the framework (including the linearity of supply curve) and
Section 6.1 presents evidence to validate the model choice.
Following the literature, we define the differentiation rate Γ ≡ 1 − γ
β
. If Γ = 0, buyers
are homogeneous: the slope of the inverse supply to own quantity equals the slope to a
competitor’s quantity. If Γ = 1, buyers are local monopsonists: a buyer’s inverse supply does
not depend on other buyers’ quantities.22 In the model, differentiation allows in a reduced
form for potential unobserved aspects of a specific buyer-seller relationship that may give the
20This inverse supply can be microfounded by assuming a representative producer whose cost function
features love for variety. Specifically, the producer profit function is: V (pE1 , ..., p
E
n , q1, ...qn) = q0+
∑n
i=1 piqi−
C(q1, ..., qn) = q0 +
∑n
i=1 piqi−(α
∑n
i=1 qi+
1
2β
∑n
i=1 q
2
i +γ
∑
j 6=i qiqj), where q0 is the output that is not sold
to traders (e.g., consumed, not harvested) and qi is the output sold to trader i (the solution presented in this
section assumes q0 > 0). A representative agent strategy featuring love for variety may itself be considered a
“reduced form” approach that aggregates heterogeneous producers having idiosyncratic preferences for each
buyer.
21As we discuss in Section 4.2, pi, the actual value paid to the farmer, may combine payments made at
different times (e.g., pre-harvest advances and post-harvest payments), which have different values for the
producers.
22The direct supply function is qi = a + bpi − c
∑
j 6=i pj , with a ≡ αβ+γ(n−1) , b ≡ β+γ(n−2)(β+γ(n−1))(β−γ) , c ≡
γ
(β+γ(n−1))(β−γ) .
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buyer market power. As discussed in Section 1, differentiation can originate from a range of
reasons, including search costs, trust, repeated relationships, and advance payment provision.
We show that accounting for interlinked transactions (e.g. advance payments) is important
to understand differentiation among traders. However, we do not aim to provide a complete
breakdown of the relevance of these individual sources of differentiation.
Buyers
The profit of buyer i in a village is given by
pii = qi(vi − pi), (2)
where qi is the quantity purchased, vi is the (net) resale price, and pi is the price paid to
producers.23
We assume buyers are ex-ante symmetric in the resale price v.24 The experiment intro-
duces a subsidy, s, for a share µ of the buyers, who then have a higher resale price. Therefore,
vi = v+ s for treatment buyers and vi = v for control buyers. Below we refer to variables for
treatment (control) buyers with subscript T (C).
We assume Cournot oligopsonistic competition: each buyer sets quantities strategically,
taking into account competitors’ choices. In Section 6.1, we provide evidence in support of
this choice and discuss alternatives such as Bertrand competition, monopsonistic competition,
and trader collusion.
3.2 Equilibrium
We consider a “group-symmetric” equilibrium in which firms in the same treatment group
behave similarly.
23A given buyer can compete in multiple villages. However, the choices she makes across villages are
assumed to be independent. Thus, we restrict the analysis to the village level and omit the village index in
the equations above.
24Appendix A.1 relaxes this assumption.
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Equilibrium
Using standard algebra, we can derive the quantities set by treatment and control buyers:
qT =
α(γ − 2β) + v(2β − γ) + s(2β + γ(−µn+ n− 1))
(2β − γ)(2β + γ(n− 1)) ;
qC =
(2β − γ)(v − α)− γµns
(2β − γ)(2β + γ(n− 1)) .
(3)
From the inverse supply functions in Equation 1, we then obtain equilibrium prices:
pT =
αβ(2β − γ) + v(2β − γ)(β + γ(n− 1)) + βγµns+ s(β − γ)(2β + γ(n− 1))
(2β − γ)(2β + γ(n− 1)) ;
pC =
(2β − γ)(β(α + v) + γv(n− 1)) + βγµns
(2β − γ)(2β + γ(n− 1)) .
(4)
It can be shown that prices imply variable markdowns, pi
vi
. Treatment (control) quantities
are increasing (decreasing) in the subsidy amount s and both are decreasing in the share of
treated buyers µ. Both control and treatment prices are increasing in both s and µ. These
intuitive comparative statics suggest that treatment changes the behavior of control firms, as
well as treatment ones. In experimental terms, the strategic response of unsubsidized traders
to the subsidy of their competitors represents a violation of the Stable Unit Treatment Value
Assumption (SUTVA).
Recovering Trader Differentiation from the Experimental Results
The differences in equilibrium outcomes between treatment and control traders are:
∆p ≡ pT − pC = s(γ − β)
γ − 2β =
sΓ
1 + Γ
(5)
and
∆q ≡ qT − qC = s
2β − γ =
s
β(1 + Γ)
. (6)
Observe that ∆p is increasing in Γ: if traders are homogeneous (i.e. Γ = 0), there can
be only one price in the market. With higher differentiation, different prices can coexist:
control traders can pay a price lower than do treated traders.25 On the other hand, ∆q is
decreasing in Γ (for given β): if traders are homogeneous, the treatment traders can expand
25If Γ = 1, i.e., each buyer is a local monopsonist, the linear supply function implies that each monopsonist
passes through one-half of the subsidy, that is ∆p = s/2.
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by taking market share from control traders. Both the price and the quantity differences
are increasing in the value of the subsidy, s, but do not depend on the share of treatment
traders, µ. This is because an additional treatment trader takes away quantity from both
control traders and other treatment traders, thus the impact on the difference between the
two types of traders is ambiguous. In the case of the specific functional form we adopt, this
impact is zero. By matching the theoretical expression in Equation (5) to its empirical analog
(which we derive in Section 4.1.2), we can recover the differentiation parameter, Γ.26 If one is
willing to assume market size, as standard experimental and quasi-experimental approaches
do, the experimental estimate of the treatment-control difference in prices is sufficient to
estimate the degree of competition among among traders, since this depends only on Γ. This
approach may be useful when the researcher is confident about plausible market boundaries,
but cluster-level randomization is unfeasible for power, logistics, or budgetary reasons.
Recovering Market Size: Combining Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Re-
sults
The model also delivers a solution for how buyer prices respond to a market-level shock
in the resale price, v, common for all traders. The (constant) pass-through rate is
ρ ≡ ∂pC
∂v
=
∂pT
∂v
= 1− 1
1 + Γ + n(1− Γ) , (7)
which is decreasing in Γ and increasing in n. Equation 7 shows that, for given Γ, the pass-
through rate allows us to recover the market size parameter, n.
3.3 Discussion of the Assumptions
The general model of symmetric imperfect competition of Atkin and Donaldson (2015)
is not readily useful to interpret heterogeneous firms pricing in response to asymmetric
taxes/subsidies within the same market (i.e. our key experimental moment).27 To relate
the experimental results to the theory, we then work with a simpler model, which makes
26We note that this estimation procedure does not use the treatment-control differences in quantities
(Equation 6). This is because ∆q depends on the level of β, as well as on Γ. In addition, using this moment
would require a definition of market size, which we later take as a parameter to estimate. Section 6.1 presents
a different method that uses percent treatment-control differences in prices and quantities. The use of percent
differences does not require an ex ante definition of market size.
27Refer also to the discussion of the general model with asymmetric firms in Weyl and Fabinger, 2013.
13
several additional assumptions. Here, we discuss some of the key ones. First, the model is
static. This may be missing important features of the economic environment we work in.
For instance, advance payment provision, which in our setting turns out to be an important
response margin for treated traders, hinges on repeated interactions.28 Second, we rely on
specific functional forms. For instance, we focus on linear supply, rather than working with
unrestricted supply elasticity.29 Similarly, we assume that v and p do not depend on quanti-
ties, thus ruling out non-linear pricing and other non-constant trader marginal costs.30 Third,
agents are symmetric, aside from the heterogeneity introduced by the experiment (i.e., the
experimental subsidy, s). Fourth, we assume the experiment does not change the competition
structure. This could happen, for instance, if the subsidy leads to entry or exit.31
Because of these restrictive assumptions, it is important to validate the choice of the
model. We do this in Section 6.1. First, in the spirit of an overidentification test, we show that
different moments of the model lead to similar estimates of the market structure parameters.
Second, we show that data do not seem to support alternative models. Third, we discuss
how our estimation framework can accommodate certain forms of baseline heterogeneity
among traders. We leave to future research to generalize the framework by relaxing the
other assumptions discussed above.
3.4 The “Theory Experiment” and the “Field Experiment”
The field experiment setting obviously presents some deviations from the stylized envi-
ronment of the model. Here, we discuss how these discrepancies may affect our estimates of
the trader differentiation rate. First, we started the experiment in the middle of the harvest
season. It is possible that, by that time, traders had already locked in purchases from some
farmers with advance payments. Thus, the degree of differentiation may have been lower if
we had started the experiment before the harvest season. Had the wholesalers announced the
subsidy earlier, it is possible that treatment traders may have accessed an even larger pool
28We discuss this topic further in Section 4.2.
29Among other reasons, this may be a concern because linear supply can be microfounded with a represen-
tative agent approach, but not with a discrete choice problem (see, e.g., Jaffe and Weyl, 2010 and Armstrong
and Vickers, 2015).
30For instance, Attanasio and Pastorino (2015) presents evidence of nonlinear pricing in rural Mexican
villages and proposes a model of price discrimination to account for this nonlinearity.
31In another example, the subsidy could relax liquidity constraints of treated traders, thus relaxing their
potential quantity constraints and changing the extent to which they can compete. Furthermore, subsidies
could foster trader investment in transport costs or other technologies (for a study of the relation among
industrial policy, competition, and innovation, see Aghion et al., 2015).
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of contestable farmers.32 In turn, our estimate of the differentiation rate, which as we will
see is already quite low, may be an upper bound relative to that obtained in a season-long
experiment.
Second, the experiment only ran until the end of the harvest season. Traders and farmers
may have behaved differently in a multi-season trial. Again, it is plausible to assume that
in a longer experiment the degree of differentiation would be even lower. For instance, in a
longer experiment, farmers may have been more willing to switch to other buyers. Future
research should assess whether varying the duration of the experiment leads to substantially
different results. With this caveat in mind, we however believe that running the experiment
until the end of the season was a reasonable length. The subsequent harvest season follows
seven-eight months of inactivity and new trading relationships may potentially arise during
that period. In addition, the high pass-through rate we described in Section 5.1 suggests
that traders respond to high-frequency price changes, which are likely to be more transitory
than our experimental season-long subsidy. The fact that the experiment lasted until the
end of the season also suggests that traders had enough time to learn about the subsidy of
their competitors, in line with the assumption of perfect information in the model.
Third, another important distinction between the basic model presented in Section 3 and
the experimental setting concerns the presence of non-study traders. These comprise about
60% of the traders operating in the study region. In principle, these could be different from
the study traders (control and treatment) at baseline. Importantly, the model presented in
Section 3 is robust to the presence of such traders. Specifically, in Appendix A.2, we discuss
a model where only a share σ of traders is included in the study, and thus study treatments
are a share σµ of traders. Non-study traders have a resale price, v′, that possibly differs
from the study traders’ one, v. We show that the equilibrium treatment-control differences,
∆p and ∆q (Equations 5 and 6), and the pass-through rate ρ (Equation 7) are unchanged.33
Therefore, the estimation approach is robust to the inclusion of non-study traders.
32As we discuss in Section 4.2, our static framework does not model the trader choice of raising prices vs.
increasing advance payment and thus we can only speculate on how the timing of the intervention would
affect the relative intensity of the trader response along these two margins.
33In this augmented model, n is the total number of traders, i.e., study and non-study.
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4 Experimental Results and the Estimation of the Trader
Differentiation Rate
In this section, we first report treatment-control differences in trader prices, advance
payment provision, and quantities purchased during the intervention period. Second, we
quantify the value of advance payments and thus the treatment-control difference in effective
prices, akin to the net present value of the payment. Third, we present estimates of the
differentiation rate.
4.1 Experimental Results
We report differences in outcomes between treatment and control traders. As discussed
above, these differences cannot be interpreted as treatment effects in the standard potential
outcomes framework of Rubin (1974): as the model in Section 3 clarified, the subsidy affects
the behavior of both treatment and control traders, as they compete for the same suppliers.
However, in our approach, these differences are nevertheless crucial estimation objects. By
matching them to the theoretical counterparts derived in the previous section, we can later
recover the competition parameters of the model.
4.1.1 Prices
First, we focus on prices that traders pay to farmers. Enumerators asked traders the
purchase price for each shipment. If the traders made payments at different times (e.g.,
before and after harvesting), enumerators recorded the total value traders paid for cocoa,
not just the harvest one. We denote this variable with p˜, so to differentiate it from the
effective price, p, we focused on in the model. As discussed above, effective prices take into
account the relative values of payments made at different times.
Figure 2 displays the price results graphically. It shows weekly averages for:34 i) world
prices (right y axis);35 ii) wholesaler prices; iii) trader prices paid by treatment traders;
34In principle, dispersion in prices for transactions on identical cocoa would also be informative of trader
differentiation. In practice, cross-sectional variance in prices is also likely to reflect measurement error and
variation in transaction characteristics, such as date, exact location, transport costs, or specific product
features. In our baseline price data, the coefficient of variation is 0.07.
35Specifically, we report the front month price on the Intercontinental Exchange for the physical delivery
of 10MT of exchange-grade cocoa from a variety of African, Asian and Central and South American origins
to any of five U.S. delivery ports, with trading code NYCC. We convert prices from USD/metric ton to
Leones/pound using an exchange rate of 1 USD=4,400 Leones.
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iv) trader prices paid by control traders. The vertical red line marks the inception of the
intervention period. The graph displays two key features. First, trader prices follow closely
wholesaler prices and these move with world prices. In particular, domestic prices respond
to the sharp decrease in the world price that occurred in November 2011. Second, this
preliminary graphical analysis displays no obvious gap in prices that treatment and control
traders pay to the farmers.
We estimate the following regression, where an observation is a shipment s delivered by
trader i of randomization pair z in week t:
p˜sizt = ηz + ηt + pi
p˜Treati + sit, (8)
where ηz and ηt are randomization pair and week fixed effects, respectively. We cluster
standard errors at the trader level (the unit of treatment).36
The term pip˜ is the coefficient of interest. Table 2, Column (1) presents a regression with-
out week fixed effects: the coefficient is pˆip˜ = −32.5 (s.e.=47.2). In Column (2), we introduce
week fixed effect and the coefficient becomes -5.5 (s.e. = 14.9). While the two coefficients are
not statistically distinguishable from each other or from zero, that the coefficient is higher
in absolute value without week effects suggests that selection in when to sell matters. In
particular, it appears that the experiment induced treatment traders to stay longer in the
market at the end of the season, when prices were lower.
One additional concern is that the treatment may induce selection in which traders make
purchases and in which locations traders visit. For this reason, in Columns (3)-(5), we add
controls referring to the trader and to the village where the majority of cocoa in the shipment
originated.37 The coefficient of interest is quite stable when including these controls. This
suggests that the selection concerns described above cannot drive the results.38
Overall, the various specifications provide evidence that prices did not differ between
treatment and control traders. As highlighted by the model, this does not necessarily imply
that traders did not respond to the subsidy. Rather, it may reflect the response of both
treatment and control traders to the subsidy. Suggestive evidence in line with this hypothesis
36Results are similar when allowing for double clustering by trader and village (Cameron et al., 2012).
37See notes to Table 2 for a list of controls. Eighty of the 123 villages listed at baseline appear as “main
village” in at least one shipment, covering approximately 85% of the suppliers listed at baseline.
38In results not presented, we also tested for effects on the prices of B and C grade cocoa. We find a
statistically significant difference for grade B prices (the point estimate is 37, which is still very far from the
value of the subsidy). Field interviews suggest that treatment traders were somewhat more willing to pay
the grade A price for cocoa that had some probability of being grade A.
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comes from the fact that the treatment-control price gap is larger in the first weeks of the
experiment (e.g., in the first three weeks of the experiment, the treatment coefficient is 31,
p=0.09), and then decreases. In Section 6.2, we use the model and our estimates to quantify
the impact of the experiment on prices paid by treatment and control traders (relative to a
counterfactual without the experiment).
4.1.2 Advance Payments
To investigate the treatment-control differences in the provision of advance payments
during the intervention period, we estimate the following regression:
AdvancePaymentfiz = ηz + pi
a
1Treati + νfi (9)
An observation is a farmer listed as a regular supplier in the trader baseline. AdvancePaymentfiz
is an indicator of whether farmer f received an advance from trader i of randomization pair
z during the course of the experiment.
Table 3 presents estimates of pia, the coefficient of interest. In Column (1), we run a linear
probability model where the outcome is a dummy equal to one if credit was provided to a
farmer. The difference between treatment and control traders is substantial: farmers reported
as regular suppliers by treatment traders in the baseline listing are 14 percentage points more
likely to receive credit from these traders, relative to a control mean of 11 percent.39 Columns
(2)-(4) show that results are similar when adding trader controls, village controls, and both
set of controls. These results suggest that while there were not differences in trader prices,
there was likely difference in effective prices paid, once the value of payments being provided
in advance is taken into account. We will address this point in Section 4.2 below.
One important limitation of our analysis is that, due to funding constraints, price and
credit data are self-reported by traders at the time of their visit to the warehouses. One
may be concerned subsidized traders may over report the price paid and credit offered to
farmers. Two observations mitigate this concern. First, we note that, if true, this would bias
upward our estimate of the differentiation rate, which, as discussed, we find to be quite low.
Second, simple reporting bias does not easily explain a positive treatment-control difference
for advance payments but not for prices.
39This control mean refers only to short-term credit given during the 2.5 months of the experimental period.
It is not inconsistent with the observation that, in the twelve months before the experiment, traders reported
giving at least one loan to approximately 70% of their suppliers, as reported in Section 2.3
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4.1.3 Quantities
Finally, we investigate the treatment-control difference in quantities purchased during
the experiment. Figure 3 shows the weekly amount purchased by the study traders and
then by treatment and control groups separately. Several patterns emerge. First, purchases
of treatment and control are balanced in the three weeks before the intervention. Second,
throughout the intervention, treatment traders purchase substantially higher volumes than
control ones. Third, total quantity purchased by study-traders increases after the beginning
of the experiment. This observation is consistent with the idea that treatment traders may
have gained market shares at the expense of non-study traders, as well as of control traders.
Finally, toward the end of the experiment, there is a stark reduction in total quantities
purchased, consistent with field reports that the season was essentially over by that time.
Table 4 presents regression results from the following regression models:
Quantityizt = ηt + ηz + pi
qTreati + ζit (10)
where an observation captures the total purchases of cocoa trader i of randomization pair z in
week t. During the experiment, treatment traders on average purchase 527 pounds per week
more than control traders, roughly a 188% difference.40 The results are robust when including
trader controls in Column (2). Overall, this is a large impact of the treatment.41 Given that
farmers had limited opportunities to increase production by the time the intervention started,
it seems likely that market-stealing effects may drive the results. Treatment traders could
steal from both control traders (20% of the market) and non-study traders (60% of the
market). The analysis in Section 6.2 supports this conjecture.
40Consistent with the large difference in quantities purchases, treatment traders were more than three
times as likely to visit the warehouse during the experimental period than control ones. Throughout the
experiment, we did not receive any complaint from either wholesalers or traders suggesting that control
traders were switching to different wholesalers. This is consistent with the fact that the experiment did not
change the wholesaler price for control traders.
41We include all the eighty traders in the sample, assigning value zero to trader-week pairs with zero
purchases, including for the traders that never showed up during the experimental period (results are similar
when dropping these traders). The treatment-control difference on quantities is substantially smaller (in
absolute value) in the last three weeks of the experiment. On the other hand, there is no significant difference
across these periods in the price regression described in Section 4.1.1.
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4.2 The Value of Advance Payments
We now quantify the value buyers provide to farmers through advance payments and
then estimate the treatment-control difference in the effective price. As discussed above, the
effective price is akin to net present value and thus reflects the relative value of payments
made at different times. This treatment-control difference in the effective price is what will
be matched to the model’s moment in order to estimate trader differentiation.
It is important to emphasize that our framework does not model the trader’s choice to
pass value to the farmer through advance payments or through higher prices.42 Moreover,
as discussed in Section 3.3, the static framework obviously does not capture the repeated
game nature of advance contracts. Accounting for these elements would require modeling a
repeated game framework of trader competition featuring multiple choice variables for the
traders. Such an approach may not generate easily closed-form solutions for the treatment-
control differences and it may feature multiple equilibria, thus substantially complicating the
estimation. We therefore assume that traders face a separable problem. First, they set their
effective price based on the inverse supply and competition they face. Second, for a given
effective price, they choose the combination of payments to be made at different times. We
do not model this second step. When making their sale choices, farmers consider only the
effective price (the net present value of the payments), not its breakdown.
While we do not explicitly model the trader choice to provide advances, we nevertheless
need to measure the value of these advance payments, and thus the effective price. For this
purpose, we define the effective price paid by buyer i as it follows:
pi = p˜i + λ · ShareAdvancesi, (11)
where p˜i is the total monetary amount paid by the trader, ShareAdvancesi is the share
of farmers to whom trader i provides advance payments.43 Therefore, λ is the extent to
which farmers value advance payments (i.e., the rate of substitution of the indifference curve
between prices and advances).44 We propose two simple strategies to estimate the value of
42We can only speculate this could be due to the fact that treatment traders can use some of the extra
profit to secure future supply with advance payments and that control traders do not have sufficient funds
to compete along this margin.
43Ideally, our data would include the specific amounts of payments made at different times. However, we
only observe shipment-level prices and an indicator of whether a certain farmer receives advance payments.
44Since the effective price enters both the farmer utility function and the trader profit function, we are
assuming that farmers and traders have the same rate of substitution, λ.
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advance payments.
Approach 1: Cross-Sectional Baseline Correlations
First, we infer the value of advance payments from the relation in the baseline cross
section between shipment prices (i.e. the total monetary amount paid by the trader for a
given shipment) and advance payments. Since we observe payment amounts at the village
level but not at the transaction level, our focus is on village-level average prices and on the
share of farmers receiving advance payments in the village.45 Table 5, column (1) shows that
moving from a village where no farmer receives advance payments at baseline to a village
where each farmer receives advance payments decreases the amount of total payments paid
by the trader by 149.6 Leones (s.e. = 74.6).46 An interpretation of this result is that a
farmer is indifferent between a trader paying a certain price and another trader who pays
149 Leones less but provides advance payments. The result is robust to the inclusion of
village-level controls (column 2). These results, while based on limited baseline data, provide
initial evidence consistent with the fact that farmers value advance payments and are willing
to accept lower prices from traders for this service.
Approach 2: Heterogeneity in Treatment-Control Differences
A second approach is to infer the value of advance payments from the relationship between
the treatment-control differences in prices and those in advance payments. In the model,
traders respond to the treatment by increasing the effective price by a certain amount. This
response can come in the form of higher prices or more frequent advance payments, and the
farmer’s indifference curve between the two will define which pairs of adjustments provide
equivalent value. The slope between the two response margins identifies their relative value,
or how much less a trader who increases her advance payments needs to adjust her prices.
For this purpose, we modify Equation (9) to allow for heterogeneity in the treatment-
45“Village-level” averages come from aggregating traders’ baseline responses on prices, locations of activity,
and number of suppliers. Here, we use villages as spatial unit to study the relationship between prices and
advance payments. This is not inconsistent with our later discussion that villages may not be the relevant
definition of market size (see Section 4.3). Our goal here is to estimate the slope of total payments with
respect to advance payment provision. This requires partitioning farmers and using the partitions as data
points. Villages are one of the many possible partitions, but a natural one to use (among other reasons,
because we have covariates at the village level).
46For this regression we only use data from the subset of villages in which we have pre-treatment data.
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control differences across villages and trader characteristics:
AdvancePaymentfizv = ηz+pi
a(Treati)+(Treati×X ′v)piav+X ′vβv+(Treati×X ′i)piai +X ′iβi+νsipv,
(12)
where Xv is the vector of village covariates and Xi is a vector of trader covariates. For any
trader-village pair iv we then compute the predicted treatment-control difference in advance
payment provision using heterogeneity by Xv and Xi: D̂TC
a
iv = X
′
vpi
a
v +X
′
ipi
a
i + pi
a. Finally,
we run the following specification to test whether village-trader pairs with larger treatment-
control differences in advance payments display lower differences in prices:
p˜sizvt = ηz + ηt + pi
p˜(Treati) + pi
p˜
a(D̂TC
a
iv · Treati) +X ′iβi +X ′vβv + kiptv. (13)
If total payments and advance payments are substitutes (i.e., λ˜ > 0), then pip˜a < 0.
47
Figure 4 provides some intuition for how this procedure works, and presents initial evi-
dence that there is a negative slope between the treatment-control differences along the two
margins. Here we estimate treatment-control differences in prices and advance payments in
each of the chiefdoms included in the study, and plot them against each other. Chiefdoms are
geographic units of local legal and political administration, and, as discussed in Acemoglu
et al. (2014) vary in contract enforcement and other institutions.48 The scatter displays a
negative relation: the regression line has a slope of -271. Table 6 presents estimates of pip˜a. In
the different columns we show estimates generated using different sets of controls to predict
D̂TC
a
iv. Since D̂TC
a
iv is an estimated regressor, we follow Bertrand et al. (2004) and Cameron
et al. (2008) and present p-values calculated using bootstrap-t procedure (Efron, 1981). We
draw 2,000 bootstrap samples, clustering the bootstrapping by randomization pair.
Our estimates of pip˜a are negative and statistically significant at 7 to 15 percent across
the three specifications. In column (1), D̂TC
a
iv is predicted using only chiefdom dummies.
The estimate using these dummies predicts that a village where treatment traders are 14
percentage points more likely to provide advance payments than control traders —the mean
coefficient in Table 3—would have a treatment-control difference in prices that is 47.8 Leones
lower than a village with no difference in advance payments. This is economically relevant
as it accounts for a reduction in the treatment difference of about one-third of the subsidy
47Since D̂TC
a
iv, is collinear with the vector of controls, its level is not included in the estimating equation.
48Unfortunately, our data do not include explicit information on contract enforcement institutions and
thus we cannot study heterogeneity in the trader responses by this variable.
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value. We find similar results in column (2), where the effect on advance payments is predicted
using chiefdom dummies and village covariates, and in column (3), where we also add trader
covariates. While the magnitude of the coefficients falls across columns, the core result holds:
price and advance payment responses are substitutes.
Discussion
One may worry that villages with higher shares of advance provision (in either baseline
level or treatment response) may have some other feature that lowers prices and thus that
we are capturing a spurious relationship. While we cannot completely rule out this concern,
three observations mitigate it. First, both approaches derive significant, qualitatively similar,
and quantitatively meaningful results even if they use different variation. In particular, the
baseline provision of advances (i.e., the source of variation used for approach 1) is not a major
factor in the heterogeneity used in approach 2.49 Second, we control for a range of village
and traders covariates.50 Third, assuming that the loan covers the entire purchase and that
the loan duration is two months (one month), the implied interest rate is around 3% (6%)
per month. This is a high rate, but not inconsistent with prevailing interest rates.51
Treatment-Control Differences in Effective Prices
Having obtained estimates of the value of advance payments —λ in the model —, it is then
possible to estimate the treatment-control differences in the effective price, p: pˆip ≡ pˆip˜+λˆ·pˆia.
Based on Tables 2 and 3, we specify pˆip˜ = −6.9 and pˆia = .14. The values of λ are 150 when
using the baseline correlations and 210 when using the treatment heterogeneity (we use the
specification with all the interactions, as presented in Table 6, col. 3). The two approaches
then lead to point estimates for the treatment-control difference in effective prices of 14.1
49We note that the estimates of λ derived in the second approach (210-334) are generally larger than the
estimates from the cross-sectional analysis in Table 5 (147-150). However, the baseline advance payment
variable, which we use in the first approach, captures whether the farmer had received advances in the twelve
months before the baseline, a longer time horizon that the one of the experiment (two months). Thus, the
two advance payment dummies may capture different intensities of advance payments.
50In principle, it is also possible that some of this credit is non-interlinked. In response to higher margins,
traders could invest part of the extra profits in their lending business, without a link to the trading activities.
However, qualitative evidence from interaction with the traders suggest that traders use the loans to secure
supply and that the bulk of the credit is repaid through lower prices at harvest time.
51According to the World Development Indicators, the average lending interest rate in the last fifteen
years was between 21% and 25% per year. In the inventory credit evaluation described in Casaburi et al.
(2014), rates on subsidized collateralized loans for agricultural smallholders were 22% per year. Rates on
uncollateralized agricultural loans and on moneylender loans are likely to be to substantially higher.
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and 22.7, respectively. These results suggest that, during the intervention, treatment traders
pay an effective price higher than the control price by 10% to 15% of the subsidy value (150
Leones). This result also suggests that, on average, those farmers that did not receive a
differential increase in advance payment from treatment traders (relative to control ones) did
receive a differentially higher price from them. For these farmers, according to our estimates,
the average difference in prices is one sixth of the subsidy (i.e. equal to the difference in
effective prices). Finally, we emphasize that, as discussed above, the difference in effective
prices could arise from price competition between traders. Therefore, it does not (generally)
measure the impact of the experiment on treatment traders (relative to a counterfactual
without the experiment).
For the approach based on baseline correlations, we compute 90% confidence interval
by jointly estimating pˆip˜, λˆ, pˆia. We obtain [-10.93, 37.53] and we can reject the null that
the difference in effective price is zero at p=0.23. For the second approach based on treat-
ment heterogeneity, we instead use bootstrap since pip˜a is a generated regressor. We cluster
resampling at the randomization pair level. The confidence interval is [-31.11, 61.33].
4.3 Recovering the Trader Differentiation Rate
To recover Γ, we match Equation (5) to its empirical analog:
∆p ≡ sΓ
1 + Γ
= pˆip1 +
ˆ˜λ · pi1a (14)
Before presenting the results, we discuss an additional assumption that is necessary to
reconcile the theory to the available data: we assume that advance payments to regular
suppliers—for whom we have data on advances—are representative of advance payments to
all the farmers. Unfortunately, it is not clear in which direction a violation of this assumption
would bias our estimates of the advance payment treatment-control difference: traders may
be less likely to extend advances to irregular suppliers or, on the contrary, they may be using
advances particularly to attract irregular suppliers.
We solve Equation (14) for Γ using the two values of the treatment-control differences in
effective prices that we derived from the two methods in Section 4.2: λ = 149 and λ = 210.
We obtain the following results for point estimates and 90% confidence intervals: i) with
λ = 149, Γ is 0.10 [-.10,.29]; ii) with λ = 210, Γ is 0.176 [-.18,.63].52
52When we ignore that λ is a generated regressor, we can reject Γ = 0 at p=0.13. If we ignored advance
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5 Combining Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Re-
sults to Estimate Market Size
Our experimental results are sufficient to describe competition if, as it is standard in
experimental approaches, one assumes market size (i.e. the size of the cluster). In this
section, however, we show that, by combining experimental and quasi-experimental estimates
of the pass-through rate, one can estimate market size, rather than assuming it.
5.1 Pass-Through of Industry-Wide Price Shocks
We first study how trader prices respond to common changes in wholesaler prices (w in
the model). As preliminary evidence of high responsiveness, Figure 2, discussed in Section
4.1.1, showed a stark reduction in prices (around 22%) in the final month of the experiment,
following a reduction in world prices and wholesaler prices. Table 7 presents the results of
the regression analysis. Column (1) reports a basic OLS regression of the trader price vs.
the wholesaler price with trader fixed effects. Throughout the table, standard errors are
clustered by date.53 The coefficient estimate is 0.89. This initial result suggests a high-level
of pass-through from traders to farmers (and low trader markdowns).
The change in wholesaler prices may be correlated with local supply shocks. To address
this concern, we instrument wholesaler prices with the international price of cocoa, as mea-
sured by the Intercontinental Exchange. Given that Sierra Leone has a small share of the
global production, it is plausible that changes in international prices are exogenous to supply
conditions in Sierra Leone. The instrument leads a very strong first stage (Kleibergen-Paap
F-stat=14,024). Column (2) in Table 7 shows that the pass-through rate estimate is 0.92.
In Column (3), we also add month fixed effects. The coefficient is stable. Finally, Column
(4) shows that the coefficient is robust to the inclusion of village fixed effects (though the
first stage becomes substantially weaker).54 Overall, our results suggest high level of pass-
through. This is consistent with Gayi and Tsowou (2015), who shows that cocoa farmer
prices in several West African countries have been very responsive to world prices in the last
two decades, with a pass-through of around 90%.55
payments, the point estimate of Γ would be -0.03.
53The pass-through estimates remain significant at p < 0.01 if we cluster by week.
54We also obtain similar results when using a lag of international prices (of a day or a week) in our
regression.
55High pass-through in these countries also suggests that our results are not driven by the self-reported
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5.2 Recovering Market Size
By matching Equation (7) to its empirical analog, and by using our previous estimate of
Γ, we can now recover n, the number of traders competing in a given location:56
ρ ≡ 1− 1
1 + Γ + n(1− Γ) = ρˆ (15)
Before presenting the results, we discuss a caveat in the interpretation of the results. As
discussed in Section 4.2, we did not collect high frequency (i.e. transaction-level) data on
advance payments. Therefore, we cannot study how, on a day-to-day basis, advances respond
to changes in the industry-wide price. We assume advance payments do not respond to the
transitory world price shocks and thus that the price pass-through we measured in Section 5.1
is equal to the pass-through of the effective price. While this seems a plausible assumption
given the transitory nature of the world price shocks, we cannot test it. However, we note
that omitting any potential credit component of pass-through would mean that our estimate
of n is a lower bound for its true value. This implies that the effective market size, which
below we find to be larger than the village, would be even larger if we accounted for credit
responses in the pass-through analysis.
We solve for n using again the two values of the treatment-control differences in effective
prices. We obtain the following results: i) with λ = 14, n, is 12.7 [7.9,17.1]; ii) with λ = 149,
n is 13.75 [90% C.I. is 7.6,20.1]. These estimates of n imply that, according to the model,
traders behave as if the number of their competitors were substantially larger (sixty to eighty
percent) than just the number of traders operating in the same village, 7.8. The difference
is consistent with the idea that some farmers have the option to sell outside the village.57
nature of the price data. High pass-through is also consistent with evidence that the impact of international
price shocks is large enough to affect local economic activities, conflicts, and long-term health outcomes (see,
e.g., Adhvaryu et al., 2013; Bru¨ckner and Ciccone, 2010; Bazzi and Blattman, 2014; Adhvaryu et al., 2014).
It is however important to note that other studies find low level of pass-through in agricultural supply chains.
Examples include Fafchamps and Hill (2008) and Mitra et al. (2013).
56In practice, we estimate Γ and n jointly.
57The option to sell to other traders shapes competition, not the actual number of traders actually pur-
chasing from each farmer. Anecdotally, we find that sales outside the village may be indirect. For instance,
a farmer may give her product to a local aggregator who then makes sales outside the village. Consistent
with the idea that villages do not necessarily match the relevant market size, we do not detect statistically
significant impacts of the number of treated traders in the village on the treatment-control differences in
prices, advance payments, and quantities. Alternative specifications that use the level, the inverse hyperbolic
sine transformation, or dummies for the number of treated traders and of study traders give similar results
(since our baseline survey has information on the number of traders but not on market shares, we cannot
run spillover regressions by baseline treatment market shares). However, as a caveat, we note that these
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6 Model Validation and Analysis
In this section, we first validate our framework choice by presenting additional evidence in
support of our model and by showing that alternative models are inconsistent with the data.
We also discuss how to extend our estimation method to account for heterogeneity along
several margins. Second, we use the model to quantify the impact of the experiment on
prices, quantities and farmer revenues (relative to a counterfactual without the experiment).
Third, we look at the impact of counterfactual experiments that target a different share of
traders. In doing so, we highlight the importance of specifically estimating the differentiation
rate, rather than just the pass-through rate.
6.1 Model Validation
Robustness
The estimate of the difference between prices paid by subsidized and unsubsidized is a test
of the null hypothesis of firm homogeneity (i.e. zero differentiation) in a wide range of models
of imperfect competition. However, estimating market structure parameters does obviously
require committing to a specific model, which in our case is admittedly a very stylized one
(we discussed the key assumptions in Section 3.3). We provide evidence in support of our
model choice. We proceed in three steps. First, since the model is overidentified, we can
use different moments to recover the same parameters of interest.58 We derive theoretical
expressions for the percent difference in prices and quantities between treatment and control
traders and match them to their empirical counterparts (0.007 and 1.88, respectively). Using
again the pass-through rate ρ as an additional moment, we recover the differentiation rate,
Γ, the market size, n, and the intercept parameter, α (this latter is only identified up to a
monetary unit parameter). The estimates are very similar to the previous ones. For instance,
when using our estimates of λ = 210, we obtain Γ = 0.181 and n = 13.82, which are very
close to our previous estimates.59
The fact that the results are so close is not mechanical. The first, more parsimonious,
approach uses level differences in prices between treatment and control; the second method
uses percent differences (both in prices and quantities). There is no mechanical relationship
estimates suffer from low power. Results are available on request.
58Appendix C includes the details of this alternative approach.
59Results are similar when using λ = 149.
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between the two sets of moments. Indeed, Appendix Figures C.1 and C.2 show that the
estimates of the two parameters would be very different when using other arbitrary values
for the treatment-control percent price difference in a neighborhood of the real ones (for given
level differences).
Alternative Models
Second, we discuss alternative models. While our baseline model is Cournot, we also
implemented the steps described above using Bertrand competition (while retaining other
assumptions on producers and buyers). The procedure delivers unrealistic values (a value of
Γ larger than one and a market size n between 1 and 2). This suggests that quantity may be
the relevant strategic choice variable in the setting. As it is well known, Cournot outcomes can
also be interpreted as reduced-form outcomes for price competition with quantity constraints
(Kreps and Scheinkman, 1983).60 Quantity constraints (arising, for instance, from transport
technologies) may be relevant in this setting.
Another candidate model could be collusion: the fact that treatment-control differences
are small for prices and high for quantities may be consistent with treatment and control
buyers forming a cartel to take advantage of the subsidy.61 However, we note that collusion
of this form would require not just an agreement between a treatment and a control trader to
game the incentive system, but also collaboration among treatment traders (since otherwise a
non-colluding treatment trader could steal the suppliers of the treatment-control pair cartel).
The latter is a more demanding form of collusion and it faces the standard enforcement
problems of a cartel. Collusion is also inconsistent with the large differential response of
treatment traders in terms of advance payment provision and with the high pass-through
rate of industry-wide price shocks presented in Section 5.1. In addition, Figure 3 does not
show any stark or sudden decline in quantities purchased by control traders during the
intervention period (which we would expect if traders were colluding to take advantage of
the subsidy).62
60We note however that our model assumes independence of traders’ choices across villages. This allows
for quantity constraints at the trader-village level, but it rules out quantity constraints on the total volume
of trader purchases (i.e., across villages).
61See Brooks et al. (2016) for a novel strategy to test collusive behavior.
62Obviously, one caveat to this claim is that it relies on simple comparisons of the weeks right before or
after the intervention and thus it does not account for potential changes in counterfactual quantities. The
key point is however that control purchases do not fall drastically, which we would expect with collusion. In
Section 6.2, we use our estimates and calculate that control purchases fall by around one-quarter.
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We also consider standard models of monopsonistic competition (adapted from the more
common monopolistic competition case): Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) predicts a markdown on
the subsidy equal to the markdown observed in the baseline data; Ottaviano et al. (2002)
predicts a difference between treatment and control traders of one-half of the subsidy value.
Neither of these predictions finds support in the data.63
Heterogeneity
Finally, we discuss the role of heterogeneity in the estimation procedure. Appendix A.1
provides details. First, the estimation can accommodate trader heterogeneity in resale prices
and, thus, heterogeneous trader size at baseline. Second, the estimation can accommodate
heterogeneous levels of differentiation. Specifically, we can account for multiple symmetric
locations with differentiation varying with the distance across locations (i.e. traders located
further away from each other are more differentiated). In this case, the estimation procedure
with pooled data recovers the differentiation rate across traders competing in the same loca-
tion and a weighted “effective market size”, where the weight of each competitor is decreasing
in its distance (and, thus, in its differentiation).
Arbitrary heterogeneity across locations in market size and differentiation is harder to
accommodate. However, in principle, one could estimate Γ and n separately in each location
and then compute the average of the parameters across villages. In practice, for our specific
experiment, estimating separate parameters in each location (using information on the main
village of provenience of the cocoa in the shipment) delivers results that are too noisy to be
useful.64
6.2 The Impact of the Experiment on Prices, Quantities, and Rev-
enues
Having gained confidence in the choice of the framework, we now use the model to quan-
tify the impact of the experiment on prices, quantities, and farmer revenues, relative to a
counterfactual scenario without the experiment’s subsidies. We also study the impact of
63Trader prices are on average 92% of the wholesaler prices. Under constant markdown case, this would
imply a difference in effective prices of at least 135 Leones between treatment and control traders.
64For instance, with few observations per village, the treatment-control difference in effective prices is often
either negative or larger than 150 Leones (i.e., the subsidy value), which in both cases implies a negative
value of Γ. However, it is reassuring that when we include village fixed effects in the regressions with pooled
data, results are very similar to the ones presented in the text.
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counterfactual experiments that subsidize different share of traders. Appendix D provides
details.
Prices
First, through the model, we can study how the subsidy affected (effective) prices traders
pay to farmers. The derivative of the prices of treatment and control traders are pinned
down by Γ, n, and µ (the share of treatment traders in the market). Figure 5 shows, for the
estimated values of the competition parameters (i.e., Γ = .176, n = 13.75), the increase in the
treatment and control prices in response to a unit subsidy, relative to the scenario without
the experiment, as a function of the share of treated traders, µ ∈ (0, 1).
At µ = 0.2—the share of treated traders in the market once including the non-study
traders—treatment (control) traders raise their effective prices by 0.30 (0.15) per unit of
subsidy and thus by 46 (23) Leones overall in response to the experimental subsidy of 150
Leones.65 This exercise confirms that that the observed experimental difference between
treatment and control, 23 Leones, is the result of a (partial) price war induced by giving the
subsidy to a share of traders.
Quantities
During the experimental period, treatment traders purchase substantially larger amounts
than control ones (+188%). Here, we aim to understand which share of this increase comes
from market stealing vs. increases in aggregate supply. The model, through the direct supply
function (which again depends on Γ and n), provides a mapping from the above price impacts
to the quantity impacts (see Appendix D).
First, we find that aggregate quantity increases by an upper bound of 0.9%.66 We can
compare this result to the increase in aggregate quantity that would occur if all of the
quantity results came from increases in aggregate supply (as opposed to market stealing),
38%. This suggests indeed that the difference in quantities between treatment and control
traders during the experiment arises almost entirely from market stealing. This is consistent
with the observation that, as the experiment was implemented at harvest time, farmers had
65In setting µ = 0.2, we are assuming that non-study traders are equal to control ones. The results in this
section are based on the value λ = 210.
66The lower bound is, trivially, zero.
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limited options to increase their supply in response to the price changes.67
Second, we can then assess the impact of the experiment on quantities purchased by
treatment and control traders. Using the upper (lower) bound on the increase in aggregate
quantity, we find that treatment traders increased their purchases by 111% (109%), relative
to the counterfactual without the experiment, and control traders decreased their purchases
by 27% (27.5%).
Farmer Revenues
The percent increase in farmer revenues is pinned down by the percent changes in prices
and quantities for treatment and control, weighted by their market shares. Using again the
lower (upper) bound on changes in aggregate supply, we find that farmer revenues increase
by 1.1% (1.2%)
6.3 Counterfactual Experiments with Different Treatment Shares
In the intervention described in this paper, only 20% of the traders received the subsidy.
We now compare the impact of alternative subsidy programs that target different treatment
shares. One way to think about the subsidy is as an income transfer program to farmers. In
particular, we are interested in comparing different subsidy interventions along their “return
on investment:” the ratio between benefits in terms of incremental farmer revenues, and their
cost (the total subsidy value). The continuous blue curve in Figure 6 presents the results
using our estimates Γ = .18, n = 13.75, under the assumption of no impact of the experiment
on aggregate quantity.68 We note several points. First, once shutting down the aggregate
quantity impact, the return is obviously always less than one: the subsidy value is passed
only imperfectly to farmer revenues. Second, the return is increasing in the share of treated
traders: the additional benefits in terms of farmer revenues when increasing µ are larger than
the extra costs. Third, the return on investment is quite flat in the share of treated traders µ.
In particular, under the estimated market structure parameters, the return when subsidizing
20% of the traders is about two-thirds of the return when targeting all the traders.
These counterfactual results may be useful to inform subsidy policies. For instance, a
government may wish to transfer income directly to farmers, but to do so may be costly,
67While farmers could not expand production dramatically, they could still increase output by harvesting
marginal fruits or reducing processing losses.
68As discussed above, the upper bound for the increase in quantity was 0.9%.
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given the absence of financial infrastructure. If the cost of physically going out to transfer
cash to farmers is more than the loss incurred by passing the subsidy through traders on
to farmers, the government may find that paying a subsidy to traders is a (second-best)
efficient way to transfer income to farmers. A helpful benchmark is the unconditional cash
transfer (UCT) program of Give Directly, studied by Haushofer and Shapiro (2016). This
program, which relies on mobile money technology to disburse payments, achieves a ratio
of recipient benefits to costs of 94.7% in Kenya and 93.2% in Uganda.69 These programs
have a higher ratio of recipient benefits to total costs than trader subsidies for any level of
µ. However, in Sierra Leone, only 4.5% of the population over 15 years has a mobile money
account (Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt et al., 2015), and so such returns may not be obtainable.
These counterfactuals are also useful to highlight the importance of estimating the two
market structure parameters separately. For a given level of the pass-through rate, different
pairs (Γ, n) lead to different returns on investment when the share of treated traders is less
than one. For instance, in Figure 6, the dashed orange curve captures the return for Γ = 0.75
and n = 43. While the orange and blue curve take, by construction, the same value for a
“pass-through experiment” that targets all traders (i.e., µ = 1), the orange line is above the
blue line for interventions that only target a subset of traders. In particular, at µ = 0.2, the
return is about fifteen percentage points higher than before.
7 Conclusion
Most of the evidence on the competitiveness of agricultural markets in Sub-Saharan Africa
relies on price-cost margins and on price dispersion analysis. In this paper, we have developed
an experimental approach that combines randomized trader subsidies and a standard model
of imperfect competition to recover key market structure parameters. We show that, in
the presence of competitive spillovers, the treatment-control price difference can inform an
intuitive test of the degree of differentiation across firms: only if firms are differentiated,
there can be systematic price differences between subsidized and non-subsidized firms. In
our study setting, we recover a degree of differentiation among traders of 0.1-0.2 on a scale
from 0 (i.e., perfectly homogeneous traders) to 1 (i.e., each trader is a local monopsonist). We
hope this approach will prove useful for the many cases in which market-level randomization
69These numbers are based on costs reported for 2014 by Give Directly, and calculated as ROI = 1 – (Cost
of identifying recipients, transferring money, and following up)/(Total Cost – Overhead), to be comparable
to our ROI measure, which includes only direct costs of the subsidy, and not overhead.
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with appropriate clusters is not feasible for economic, logistical, or budgetary reasons.
In addition, by using a quasi-experimental estimate of the pass-through rate as an ad-
ditional moment, we can infer the number of traders that compete for supply, rather than
assuming it. We recover an effective market size of 13-14 traders —about 75% larger than
the number of traders operating in a village (7.8). This finding may have implications for
the design of cluster randomized controlled trials that attempt to generate variation at the
market level: the relevant number of economic actors may be greater than those physically
observed in a location. While this analysis relies on a specific model, several robustness
exercises provide support for the model choice.
Overall, our results suggest a competitive intermediary sector, at least for those traders
who purchase from farmers. This suggests that low differentiation and a high level of com-
petitiveness can be found in settings where traders provide credit to their suppliers. This
may be useful to consider the relevance of our findings for other settings: financial service
provision along the supply chain does not necessarily induce a strong supplier base segmen-
tation across firms. When considering external validity, we must also note that lower levels
of the value chains (e.g. wholesalers, exporters), may be substantially less competitive than
traders.70 Understanding the degree of competitiveness at these other levels is an important
question for future research.
70Graphical evidence in Figure 2 suggests that, while wholesaler prices respond to changes in the interna-
tional price, pass-through is substantially more incomplete at these lower levels of the supply chain.
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Figure 1: Map of study villages
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Figure 2: Cocoa Prices
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N otes: The figure presents average weekly prices for: i) international cocoa prices; ii) prices the study
wholesalers pay to the traders; iii) prices control traders pay to farmers; iv) prices treatment traders pay
to farmers. Wholesaler and trader prices data collection was suspended for most of three weeks (w47-w49).
The vertical line marks the beginning of the intervention period.
Figure 3: Purchases of Cocoa
0
20
00
0
40
00
0
60
00
0
80
00
0
2011w40 2011w44 2011w48 2012w1
week
Treatment+Control Traders Control Traders
Treatment Traders
Cocoa Purchases ( Lbs. )
N otes: The figure shows the total amount of cocoa purchases by study traders (i.e., control and treatment
traders), control traders, and treatment traders. The vertical line marks the beginning of the intervention
period. Data collection was suspended for most of three weeks (w47-w49).
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Figure 4: Estimating λ: Treatment-Control Differences by Chiefdom, Prices vs. Advance
Payments
-1
50
-1
00
-5
0
0
50
Tr
ea
tm
en
t-C
on
tro
l D
iff
er
en
ce
 in
P
ric
es
-.1 0 .1 .2 .3 .4
Treatment-Control Difference in Advances
T-C Differences by Chiefdom: Prices vs. Advances
N otes: The scatter reports the the correlation across price and advance payments treatment-control differ-
ences, estimated separately across the five chiefdoms included in the study. The regression line has a slope
of -271.
Figure 5: Counterfactual Experiments: Trader Prices
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N otes: The graph shows the impact of counterfactual experiments on (effective) prices paid by control
traders (continuous line) and treatment traders (dashed line). Specifically, it reports the increase in prices
in response to a unit-subsidy as a function of the share of treated traders, µ. The vertical line reports the
share of traders treated in our experiment, µ = 0.2. At this value of the treatment share, control (treatment)
traders increase their prices by 0.15 (0.30) per unit of subsidy, respectively, relatively to a scenario without
the experiment. For µ→ 1, the response of treatment traders tends to the pass-through rate, 0.92.
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Figure 6: Counterfactual Experiments: Return on Investment
 
N otes: The graph reports the return to investment (y-axis) for experiments that target a share µ (x-
axis) of traders with a unitary per-unit subsidy. The return to investment is defined as the ratio between
the additional farmer revenues generated by the intervention and the cost of the subsidy. We conduct the
simulations assuming no response in aggregate supply. Section 6.2 describes the procedure to recover these
values. The continuous curve describes the results using the market structure parameters estimated in the
paper (Γ = .18, n = 14). The dashed curve describes the results using an alternative pair (Γ = .75, n = 43)
that gives the same pass-through rate, ρ = .92, than the pair of values estimated in the paper.
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Tables
Table 1: Baseline Trader Summary Statistics
Covariate Treatment Control Treatment -
Control
Panel A: Baseline Interview
Self-estimate bags sold in 2011 20.0 18.6 1.5
(28.3) (18.5) (2.23)
Age, years 38.2 36.9 1.4
(8.2) (10.2) (1.91)
Years trading cocoa 8.1 8.9 -0.8
(5.4) (5.5) (1.2)
Years selling to study wholesaler 5.7 7.3 -1.6
(4.8) (4.9) (0.86)*
Cement or tile floor in house ∈ {0, 1} 0.53 0.63 -0.1
(0.51) (0.49) (0.1)
Mobile phone owner ∈ {0, 1} 0.90 0.93 -0.03
(0.30) (0.27) (0.06)
Access to storage facility ∈ {0, 1} 0.88 0.78 0.10
(0.33) (0.42) (0.09)
Villages operating in 4.25 4.87 -0.62
(1.64) (2.02) (0.39)
Number of suppliers per village 5.8 6.2 -0.35
(3.3) (3.6) (0.84)
Share of suppliers given credit since March 0.72 0.68 0.04
(0.32) (0.28) (0.05)
Panel B: Pre-treatment shipment data
Price Paid to Farmer (shipment-level) 3,137 3,136 1.2
(154) (151) (41.9)
Pounds sold during pre-treatment (weekly) 345 339 6.2
(694) (762) (96.5)
Notes: Panel A presents balancing for the variables defined in the baseline survey. Some baseline
survey variables are missing for one trader. The column “Treatment-Control” presents results from
a regression on treatment and randomization pairs. Panel B presents balancing for variables from
pre-experiment shipment data. Prices are defined only for the subset of traders that delivers at
least one shipment during this period (56 traders). Quantities are defined for all traders and are
equal to zero for traders who don not make any delivery in the pre-experimental period. Standard
errors are clustered by trader. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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Table 2: Treatment-Control Differences in Prices
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Bonus ∈ {0,1} -32.52 -5.47 -5.92 -12.87 -6.86
(47.16) (14.95) (16.99) (13.21) (15.41)
Control Group Mean 2987 2987 2987 2987 2987
Week FE X X X X
Trader Controls X X
Village Controls X X
Observations 1079 1079 1060 1079 1060
Notes: The table reports the difference between the prices paid by treatment and control traders to
farmers during the experiment, measured in Leone per pound. The subsidy to treatment traders was Le.
150. per pound. An observation is a shipment delivered by the trader to a wholesaler. Trader controls are
baseline values of pounds of cocoa sold, number of villages operating in, number of suppliers buying from,
share of clients given credit in baseline, age, years of working with wholesaler, and dummies for ownership
of a cement or tile floor, mobile phone and access to a storage facility. Village controls are baseline share of
suppliers begin given credit, number of other bonus traders and number of study traders, miles to nearest
town, and number of clients across all traders. Data on some trader controls are missing for one trader and
thus the number of observations falls in Columns (3) and (5). Standard errors are clustered at the level of
the trader. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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Table 3: Treatment-Control Differences in Advance Payments
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment Trader 0.14∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Control Group Mean 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
Trader Controls X X
Village Controls X X
Observations 1837 1825 1837 1825
Notes: The table reports the difference between treatment and control in the share of regular suppliers
that receive advance payments (binary indicator) during the experimental period. An observation is a farmer
a trader listed as regular supplier in the baseline survey. Trader controls are baseline values of pounds of
cocoa sold, number of villages operating in, number of suppliers buying from, share of clients given credit
in baseline, age, years of working with wholesaler, and dummies for ownership of a cement or tile floor,
mobile phone and access to a storage facility. Village controls are baseline share of suppliers begin given
credit, number of other bonus traders and number of study traders, miles to nearest town, and number of
clients across all traders. Data on some trader controls are missing for one trader and thus the number of
observations falls in Columns (2) and (4). Standard errors are clustered at the level of the trader. ***p<0.01,
**p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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Table 4: Treatment-Control Differences in Quantities
(1) (2)
Treatment Trader 537.12∗∗∗ 527.72∗∗∗
(54.0) (54.2)
Control Group Mean 282.5 282.5
Trader Controls X
Observations 640 632
Notes: The table reports the difference between the quantities of cocoa purchased by treatment and
control traders during the experimental period. An observation is a week*trader (8*80). Trader controls are
baseline values of pounds of cocoa sold, number of villages operating in, number of suppliers buying from,
share of clients given credit in baseline, age, years of working with wholesaler, and dummies for ownership of
a cement or tile floor, mobile phone and access to a storage facility. Data on some trader controls are missing
for one trader and thus the number of observations falls in Column (2). Standard errors are clustered at the
level of the trader. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
Table 5: The Value of Advance Payments: Baseline Correlations
(1) (2)
Share of Farmers Receiving Advance Payments -149.65∗ -147.19∗
(74.66) (75.47)
Dependent Variable Mean 3138 3138
Village Controls X
Observations 43 43
Notes: The table presents correlation between baseline value of the average village cocoa price and the
share of farmers receiving advance payments in the village. The sample includes 44 villages for which we
have baseline cocoa shipment data. Village controls include: number of traders in the village, distance from
the wholesaler warehouse, and number of farmers in the village. Standard errors allow for heteroskedasticity.
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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Table 6: The Value of Advance Payments: Heterogeneity in Treatment-Control Differences
(1) (2) (3)
Treat* Estimated Treament Effect on Credit -341.79 -300.13 -209.87
p-values from boostrapped t-stats [.10] [.15] [.07]
Chiefdoms X X X
Village Controls X X
Trader Controls X
Observations 1060 1060 1060
Notes: The dependent variable is the price paid by the trader for the shipment of cocoa. Each column
presents estimates of pip˜a from equation 13. P-values in brackets are derived from pairs cluster bootstrap-t
at the randomization pair level using 1,000 replications. Trader controls are baseline values of pounds of
cocoa sold, number of villages operating in, number of suppliers buying from, share of clients given credit in
baseline, age, years of working with wholesaler, and dummies for ownership of a cement or tile floor, mobile
phone and access to a storage facility. Village controls are baseline share of suppliers begin given credit,
number of other bonus traders and number of study traders, miles to nearest town, and number of clients
across all traders.
Table 7: Pass-Through from Wholesaler to Trader Prices
OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Wholesaler Price 0.89∗∗∗ 0.92∗∗∗ 0.93∗∗∗ 0.90∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.09)
Control Group Mean 3007 3007 3007 3007
Kleibergen-Paap First Stage F-stat 1408.2 471.6 5.5
Trader FE X X X X
Month FE X X
Village FE X
Observations 1254 1254 1254 1254
Notes: The table reports the pass-through from wholesaler prices (i.e. paid to traders) to trader prices
(i.e., paid to farmers). Both are measured in Leones per pound. An observation is a shipment delivered
by the trader to a wholesaler before or during the intervention. In Columns (2)-(4), wholesaler prices are
instrumented with the front-month prices for liquid cocoa futures, obtained by the Intercontinental Exchange.
Standard errors are clustered by day. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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Appendix
A Theory Appendix
A.1 Trader Heterogeneity
The baseline model presented in Section 3 assumes that traders are symmetric at baseline and that the
experimental subsidy is the only source of heterogeneity. The key results of the model, and thus the empirical
strategy to recover the competition parameters, are robust to extensions that account for different forms of
heterogeneity.
First, we allow baseline differences across traders in their resale prices.71 For simplicity, we consider a
case with two types of traders. Absent the experiment, a share σ of traders has resale price v, and a share
1−σ has resale price v′ = v+w. With the experiment, a share µ of traders in each group receives a per unit
subsidy s. In equilibrium, firms with higher resale prices purchase larger quantities and pay higher prices
(unless Γ = 0). By randomization, treatment is uncorrelated with firm characteristics. This orthogonality is
the key benefit of randomization even if, as we discuss in the paper, the SUTVA is violated.
Within each group of traders (v and v’), the difference in equilibrium prices between treatment (subsi-
dized) and control (unsubsidized) firms is ∆p = sΓ1+Γ . Therefore, trivially, this is the value for the expected
price difference: E[∆p] ≡ E[pT−pC ] = sΓ1+Γ . Similarly, it can be shown that E[∆q] ≡ E[qT−qC ] = sβ(1+Γ) . Fi-
nally, the linear inverse supply implies constant pass-through: For each type of firm, ρ ≡ ∂p∂v = 1− 11+Γ+n(1−Γ) ,
and thus E[ρ] takes the same value. Therefore, the key moments presented in Equations (5), (6), and (7) are
unchanged.
Second, we allow for multiple differentiation rates across traders. We consider again a simple case with two
groups of competitors. In a symmetric environment with n traders, each trader has n2 −1 “close” competitors,
with substitution rate γ, and n2 “far” competitors with substitution rate κγ, 0 < κ < 1. Therefore, the inverse
supply for each trader i is pi = α + βqi + γ(
∑
j∈C pj + κ
∑
j∈F pj), where C and F represent close and far
competitors, respectively.
It can be shown that the equilibrium differences between treatment and control are unchanged: ∆p = sΓ1+Γ
(where Γ is still 1 − γβ and ∆q = sβ(1+Γ) . In addition, the pass-through rate is ρ = 1 − 11+Γ+n˜(1−Γ) , where
n˜ ≡ n2 (1+κ) can be again defined as the “effective market size”, the number of competitors weighted by their
(relative) substitution parameter κ. In this case, the estimation procedure presented in the paper therefore
recovers Γ and n˜.72
A.2 Non-study Traders
As discussed above, the model presented in Section 3 features symmetric traders. From this pool of
identical traders, a share µ receives the experimental subsidy. In our field experiment setting, about 60%
of the traders are not included in the study (and we do not collect data on them). These traders may be
71This is equivalent to varying producer costs in an oligopoly model.
72The result extends to the general case of m = 1, ..,M groups of traders, with differentiation Γm = κ
m−1Γ.
In this case, ∆p, ∆q, and ρ are as above and n˜ = nM
1−κM
1−κ .
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fundamentally different than the ones we include in the study. We present an extension of the model that
accounts for this issue.
There is a share σ of study traders (S) and a share 1− σ of non-study traders (NS). We allow the two
types of farmers to vary in their resale prices: vS = v and vNS = v +w,w 6= 0. Inverse supply for trader i is
again pi = α+ βqi + γ
∑
j 6=i qj .
73 A share µ of the study traders, and thus a share µσ of all traders, receives
the subsidy.
Our experimental estimates only compare prices of the study traders. The main object of interest is
pST − pSC , where the subscript S refers to the share σ of study traders. The moments derived in Section 3
are robust to the presence of non-study traders. It can be shown that ∆pS ≡ pST − pSC = sΓ1+Γ . This is the
same value we obtained in the baseline model, where we assumed that all traders were part of the experiment
(Equation 5). A similar result is obtained for ∆qS . Finally, the pass-through rate is also unchanged (again,
this is due to the common pass-through functional form).
B Cocoa Quality
Both international and local cocoa prices vary with quality. Factors contributing to poor quality cocoa
are high moisture content, mold, germination, a lack of fermentation and slate, a discoloration signaling
poor flavor. There is wide agreement on these standards internationally. For a discussion, refer to CAO-
BISCO/ECA/FCC (2015) and, for the specific case of West Africa, David (2005). Other dimensions of quality
affecting price on the international market are various fair-trade and environmental certifications. Such cer-
tification generally requires that beans can be verifiably traced to individual producers. In our market, there
is not yet the infrastructure to do such tracing, and so this quality dimension does not apply.
In our grading system, inspectors from our research team with local language skills stayed in the ware-
houses of wholesalers and tested a sample of 50 beans from each bag of cocoa as it arrived. Moisture was
measured using Dickey John MiniGAC moisture meters, two of which were generously donated by the man-
ufacturer. Other defects were spotted by eye, after cracking beans open with a knife. Grade A beans have
no more than average 11.5% moisture, no more than 2% mold (1 bean of 50), and no less than 72% beans
with no defect (36 beans of 50). Grade B beans have no more than 22% moisture, 4% mold (2 beans of 50)
and no less than 52% good beans (27 beans of 50). Grade C applies to any bean failing to be grade A or B.
73That is, we assume a common degree of differentiation across study and non-study traders.
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C Recovering Competition Parameters: An Alterna-
tive Approach
This Appendix presents details about the alternative approach to recover Γ and n that we presented in
Section 6.1. Our goal is to identify alternative (quasi-)experimental moments and to compare the results we
obtain from these moments to the ones of the main approach presented in the paper. Showing that different
moments deliver similar estimates would provide support for the specific model we use.
C.1 Methodology
Our main estimation approach relies on two moments: the level difference in treatment and control prices
(Equation 5) and the pass-through rate of changes in wholesaler prices (Equation 7). In this section, we show
how the key parameters Γ and n, and the intercept parameter α, can be recovered from the percent differences
between treatment and control in prices and quantities, combined again with the pass-through rate.
First, we derive theoretical expressions for the percent differences between treatment and control in prices
and quantities:
%∆p ≡ p
T − pC
pC
=
sΓ(1 + (1− Γ)(n− 1))
(1− Γ)µns+ (1 + Γ)((1− Γ)(n− 1)v + (α+ v)) (C.1)
and
%∆q ≡ qT − qC
qC
=
s(−2− (1− Γ)(n− 1))
(1− Γ)µns− (1 + Γ)(v − α) (C.2)
For a given value of the subsidy s, these expressions depend on additional parameters, i.e., µ, v, α, as
well as on those we aim to recover, i.e., Γ and n. We calibrate the value of µ and v. We set the former at
1/5, the share of treatment traders out of the total number of traders (study and non-study). Assigning a
value to the latter requires some additional assumption. The (average) value of the wholesaler price (i.e. the
price at which traders resell), is Le. 3,260. The average price at which traders purchase is Le. 2,987, 91%
of the wholesaler price. However, in the model, v is the net resale price, net of other costs the traders may
incur and that we do not observe, such as transport and storage costs. We set v = 3, 145, which implies a
5% markdown.74
C.2 Results
Having assigned values to µ and v, we have a system of three equations—Equations C.1, and C.2 defined
above and the pass-through formula (Equation 7)—, in three unknowns, Γ, n, and α. We note that the
intercept term α is identified only up to the currency unit choice.
During the experiment, control traders pay an average price of 2,987. The average likelihood of advance
provision for control traders is 0.11. Therefore, given λ = 209, the average control effective price is 3,010.
This implies that the percent price difference between treatment and control traders during the experiment
is 0.7%. The average quantity purchased by control traders is 282.5 kilograms. Thus the percent different
between treatment and control traders is 188%.
74Results are quite stable when using other values of v, spanning between 2,987 (the average trader price)
and 3,260 (the average wholesaler price).
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Solving the equation system with these values for %∆p and %∆q, we obtain the following estimates for
the three parameters of interests: Γ = 0.181, n = 13.8, and α = 2, 015. The results for Γ and n are thus very
close to the ones obtained when using the more parsimonious methodology described in the main text. We
see this as evidence in support of the specific competition model chosen for the analysis.
Finally, we emphasize that the similarity of the results between the two approaches is not a mechanical
result since one uses the level of the difference between treatment and control prices, while the other uses
the percent differences between treatment and control in both prices and quantities. Figure C.1 and C.2
confirm this point: the two graphs show, respectively, how the estimated values of Γ and n would vary with
different values of the percent treatment-control difference in prices, pT−pCpC , in a neighborhood of the real
value, 0.007 (represented by the vertical gray line). In each graph, the large dot reports the estimate from
the main estimation presented in the text. The key point is that, while the estimates derived when using
the real value pT−pCpC are close to those in the main text, they would be quite different when using arbitrary
values of pT−pCpC (i.e. if the treatment-control difference in the level of prices were equivalent to a different
value of the difference in percent terms.).
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C.3 Figures
Figure C.1: Sensitivity of Γ to pT−pC
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N otes: The graph reports sensitivity of the estimate of Γ obtained from the method described in Appendix
C to the value of the percent treatment-control price difference. The dot represent the estimate from the
main method presented in Section 4.3.
Figure C.2: Sensitivity of n to pT−pC
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N otes: The graph reports sensitivity of the estimate of Γ obtained from the method described in Appendix
C to the value of the percent treatment-control price difference. The dot represent the estimate from the
main method presented in Section 5.2.
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D The Impact of the Experiment on Prices, Quantities,
and Farmer Revenues
This Appendix provides details of the steps to assess the impact of the experiment on prices, quantities,
and farmer revenues (Section 6.2).
Setup
We use the superscript 0 to refer to the pre-intervention period and 1 to refer to the intervention period.
At baseline, traders are homogeneous and pay p0.75 Each trader thus faces the direct supply. Thus their
direct supply function is q0i = a+ bp
0
i − c
∑
i 6=j p
0
j .
76 Symmetry implies q0 = a+ (b− c(n− 1))p0. Aggregate
supply is thus Q0 = nq0 = n[a+ (b− c(n− 1))p0].
Impact on Prices
To assess the impact of the experiment on the prices of control and treatment traders, we first compute the
derivative of equilibrium prices with respect to the subsidy: ∂pT∂s =
Γ− (Γ−1)µnΓ−Γn+n+1
Γ+1 ,
∂pC
∂s =
(1−Γ)µn
(Γ+1)(1+Γ+n(1−Γ)) .
The impact of the experiment on prices is then given by dpg =
∂pg
∂s s, for g = {T,C}. Given our estimates
of Γ and n, we can compute dpT = p
1
T − p0 = 46 and dpC = p1C − p0 = 23.77 Using a baseline price of 2,964
(mean of the effective price for control traders during the experiment minus dpC), we obtain p
1
T /p
0 = 1.015
and p1C/p
0 = 1.008. The experimental subsidy, which was worth about 5% of the baseline price, increased
treatment (control) prices by around 1.5% (0.8%).
Impact on Quantities
Given dpT and dpC , we can write: q
1
T = a+b(p
0+dpT )−c
(
(µn−1)(p0+dpT )+(1−µ)n(p0+dpC)
)
. With
some algebra, we obtain q1T = q
0 +
(
bdpT − c(
(
µn− 1)dpT + (1− µ)ndpC
))
︸ ︷︷ ︸
dqT
. Similarly, for the control group,
q1C = q
0 +
(
bdpC − c(µndpT + ((1− µ)n− 1)dpC)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
dqC
. The aggregate quantity during the experimental period,
Q1, is then Q1 = n
(
µq1T +(1−µ)q1C
)
= n
(
µ(q0 +dqT )+(1−µ)(q0 +dqC)
)
= Q0 +n
(
µdqT + (1− µ)dqC
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
dQ1
. The
increase in aggregate quantity induced by the experiment can the be written as: dQ1 ≡ Q1−Q0 = n(b−c(n−
1)
)(
µdpT +(1−µ)dpC
)
. In turn, the percent impact is: dQ
1
Q0 =
n
n
(
b−c(n−1)
)(
µdpT+(1−µ)dpC
)
a+(b−c(n−1))p0 =
µdpT+(1−µ)dpC
a
b−c(n−1) +p
0 .
Since we do not estimate β and γ separately, but only their ratio, we cannot quantify dQ
1
Q0 . However, assuming
75Thus, throughout the exercise, we assume non-study traders and study traders are homogeneous before
the experiment.
76The direct supply function is qi = a + bpi − c
∑
j 6=i pj , with a ≡ αβ+γ(n−1) , b ≡ β+γ(n−2)(β+γ(n−1))(β−γ) , c ≡
γ
(β+γ(n−1))(β−γ) .
77This is, by construction, consistent with our estimate of the difference in (effective) prices between
treatment and control traders.
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a ≥ 0 (which holds in our estimates) and noticing that b− c(n− 1) > 0 (since β > γ), then µdpT+(1−µ)dpCp0 is
an upper bound on dQ
1
Q0 .
From the percent impact on aggregate quantity, we can now compute the impact for treatment and
control quantities. We do this in a four steps
1. Aggregate quantity is Q1 = n
(
µq1T + (1− µ)q1C
)
= nq0(1 +
dQ1
Q0 )
2. We define the ratio of treatment to control quantities during the experimental period: R ≡ q1T /q1C .
Then,
Q1 = n
(
µRq1C + (1− µ)q1C
)
3. We can now solve for q1C (relative to q
0):
q1C
q0
=
1 + dQ
1
Q0
µR+ (1− µ)
We note that we can measure the ratio R in the data
4. Finally, we can easily derive
q1T
q0 = R
q1C
q0 = R
1+ dQ
1
Q0
µR+(1−µ)
In our experiment, µ = .2, 1− µ = .8, dpT = 46, dpC = 23. p0 = 2, 964. Therefore we compute the upper
bound on the percent change in aggregate quantity as
d̂Q1
Q0
=
27
a
b−c(n−1) + 2987
≤ 27.6
2987
= 0.009
In response to the experiment, aggregate quantity raises by at most 0.9%. Also, we have a trivial lower bound,
which is zero (i.e., the aggregate quantity is constant). As a benchmark, we can quantify the increase in
aggregate quantity we would observe without any market stealing (i.e., the control quantities were unchanged).
In this case aggregate quantity would go up by µ∗188%+(1−µ)∗0, that is by 38%.78 This suggests that most
of the difference between treatment and control in quantity purchases comes indeed from market stealing.
Finally, given the upper bound of 0.009, we can compute that, relative to a world without experiment,
controls reduce their purchases by 27% and treatment increase their purchaes by 111%. At the lower bound
of 0, controls reduce their purchases by 27.5% and treatment traders increase their purchaes by 109%.
Impact on Farmer Revenues
In the pre-experiment period, farmer revenues are simply r0 = p0Q0 = p0nq0. In the experimental period,
these become r1 = n
(
µp1T q
1
T + (1− µ)p1Cq1C
)
. Therefore, the ratio between these two values is a function of
the quantities we derived above:
r1
r0
=
µp1T q
1
C + (1− µ)p1Cq1C)
p0nq0
= µ
p1T
p0
q1T
q0
+ (1− µ)p
1
C
p0
q1C
q0
78188% is the percent difference in treatment and control quantities during the experiment.
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In our experiment, taking the upper bound dQ1/Q0 = 0.009, we obtain:
r1
r0
= µ
p1T
p0
q1T
q0
+ (1− µ)p
1
C
p0
q1C
q0
= .2 ∗ 1.015 ∗ 2.11 + .8 ∗ 1.007 ∗ .73 = 1.02
At the lower bound of no change in aggregate quantity, r1r0 = 1.01.
Returns on Investment and Counterfactual Experiments
Finally, we consider the return on investment (ROI) on experiments that treat a share µ of traders.
We focus on a social planner whose welfare is linear in farmer revenues (and does not depend on trader
revenues). Therefore, the ROI is the ratio between the increase in farmer revenues and the cost of the
program. The former is r1 − r0 =
((
µ
p1T
p0
q1T
q0
+ (1− µ)p
1
C
p0
q1C
q0
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
r1/r0
−1
)
np0q0︸ ︷︷ ︸
r0
. The cost of the intervention is
C = µnsq1T . The derivations in the paper consider the case in which the experiments do not induce an increase
in aggregate quantity. We focus first on variations in µ given our estimates of (Γ, n) and then consider returns
for alternative values of these parameters. Section 6.2 presents the results.
56
